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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
EVIDEN CE - CoNDITIoNAL DELIVEY OF DEEDS TO GRANE -
PAROL EVIDENCE. - The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia on demurrer to a bill to cancel certain deeds, deeds of
trust, and notes, held, that the grantee might show by extrinsic
evidence that the delivery of the deeds to the respective grantees
was to become effective only on the happening of a future con-
tingency or condition, although the deeds were absolute on their
faces. Brown v. Cabel.
It has long been settled law in a majority of states that if a
deed is delivered to the grantee to take effect on condition, the
condition is void and the delivery of the deed is absolute. To
this effect are a number of decisions in West Virginia.! While
the doctrine has been criticized severely both by legal authors and
by judges it has proved singularly persistent. In the principal
case this doctrine and the cases supporting it were not referred
to yet the decision seems, in effect, to overrule such previous de-
cisions. The common reason for the rule usually given is that to
permit extrinsic evidence would violate the parol evidence rule.
Virginia has abolished the doctrine, and contrary to the great
weight of American authority allows the conditional delivery of
a sealed or unsealed instrument to be shown by extrinsic evidence
The parol evidence rule presents little difficulty, as written con-
tracts, from early times, however full and, complete, have been
set aside and defeated by oral proof that prior or contemporaneous
thereto it was agreed the written contract was not to take effect
at all under certain conditions; and the delivery of deeds is an
extrinsic fact almost always proved by parol evidence. The parol
evidence rule seems to be an excuse and not a reason.'
That attempts to deliver to the grantee on condition are not
uncommon is shown by the fact that our Court of Appeals has
passed upon the question five times in less than twenty years.'
Laymen are not, in civil matters, presumed to know the law,' and
1161 S. E. 438 (W. Va. 1931). Seemingly in some manner the conclusion
had been reached in West Virginia that the doctrine applies only to deeds
of real estate and not to bonds, notes and the like. Newlin v. Beard, 6 W.
Va. 110 (1873); Stuart v. Livesey, 4 W. Va. 45 (1870). However the cases
laying down the doctrine involved the latter type of instrument. Whiddon's
Case, Cro. Eliz. 520 (1596); Williams v. Green, Cro. Eliz. 884 (1602).
'See the cases collected in Note (1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 194.
'Whitaker v. Lane, 108 Va. 317, 345, 104 S. E. 252 (1920).
'See Simonton, Transferring Tile to Land by Deed (1930) 36 W. VA.
L. Q. 343, 349 for an indictment of the alleged reasons for the rule.
rSupra n. 2.
a In Landsdown v. Landsdown, Mosley 364, 25 Eng. Reprint 441 (1730) the
Chancellor is reported as saying: "That maxim of law, Ignorantia juris non
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the elimination of this trap into which so many blunder with
disastrous consequences seems sustained by justice and common
sense. Yet one cannot but regret that the court did not see fit
to overrule its previous decisions in express terms.
-DONALD M. HUTTON.
HIGHWAYS -. REASONABLE HIGHWAY USES - ERECTION Op
SCRENS TO HIDE BILLBOARDS. - The Superintendent of Public
Works of New York State has evidently taken to heart the amusing
satire by Stephen Leacock depicting George Washington marching
today through New Jersey and across the Delaware to Phila-
delphia, guided by modern billboards.' And the Superintendent's
means of remedying the situation is indeed a novel one. Land
adjoining a highway had been leased for the purpose of erecting
a billboard, and immediately the state erected a screen or board
upon the highway right of way to hide the billboard. In a suit
to compel the state to remove the screen the state defended upon
the ground that its object was "to prevent motorists from seeing
the billboard and thus afford no reason for their taking their eyes
off the wheel". The court, however, found that this was not the
purpose of the screen, and, since it was not erected for a highway
purpose, compelled the state to remove it.2
'Whether the state has a fee in the right of way or only an
easement, modern cases seem to hold that the adjoining property
owner is entitled to compensation, if the highway is used for a
public purpose, but a different purpose than that for which the
property was originally taken. In either case the state takes only for
the particular purpose set out at the beginning.' As the taking of
excusat, is in regard to the public; ignorance cannot be pleaded in excuse of
crimes, but does not hold in civil cases."
Martindale v. Falkner, 2 C. B. 719 (1846), Maule, J., "There is no pre-
sumption in this country that every person knows the law, it would be contrary
to common sense and reason if it were so."
Thayer, P'esumptions and the Law of Evidence (1889) 3 HAV. L. REV.
141, 165: "Many of these maxims and ground principles get perversely and
inaccurately expressed in this form of a presumption, as when the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no one is put in the form that everyone is pre-
sumed to know the law."
155 HARPER's MAGAziNE 382 (1927).
'Perlmutter v. Greene, 249 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1931).
Spencer v. R. R. Co., 23 W. Va. 406 (1884); Davis v. Spragg, 72 W. Va.
672, 79 S. E. 652 (1913); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. Ed. 224
(1877). See DnmoN, MumoPAT. CoroRATIONS (5th ed, 1911) § 1136,
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